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A RESPONSE 
lohn I. Flynn"" 
Speculation proceeding upon no set path and mInImIZIng a logical thread of 
analysis may often be far more productive of insights into our never-ending search 
for knowledge than the most logical and analytical pursuit of "truth." The latter 
process is often premised upon unchallenged and unchallengeable truths; a set of 
unexamined premises which both control perceptions of reality and import a 
dangerous degree of rigidity into the process of reconciling the need for order in 
society with preserving individualism - the primary functional goal of the legal 
process. Professor Frankel's speculation rightly proceeds upon no set thread of 
logical development but consists of a series of insights concerning a conflict of 
fundamental values in the continuing evolution of the premises upon which our 
society is organized. We are given a series of insights, potentially related, possibly 
conflicting and certainly stimulating. Many of Frankel's insights are penetrating 
and of value. Others suggest beliefs and assumptions one can only call disturbing, 
if not potentially dangerous to the peaceful and acceptable implementation oflegal 
decision-making to govern our society. 
Professor Frankel hypostatizes law (he thingify's it) to the point where one is 
left with several potential inferences posing conundnuns of the first order.~ A dis-
tinction is suggested between judgments premised upon religious values and those 
derived from worldly values (secular). The former are called moral judgments 
and it is inferred the latter are not. It should be recognized that the choice to give 
recognition to a "right of privacy" or bodily integrity of a pregnant woman and 
the decision not to extend personhood status to a fetus for purposes of constitu-
tional analysis, are just as much choices premised upon moral values as are the 
converse value choices. Understanding the significance of what the Court was 
about in Roe fl. Wade is scarcely advanced by pretending otherwise, and praise or 
criticism of the result must be superficial at best since the moral premises or ethical 
value choices underlying the decision are not dredged up for critical examination. 
Highlighting the prohibition experience and the current experience with marijuana 
regulation is instructive as to the appropriate, if any, use of the criminal law in 
regulating abortion or any other area of individual activity subjected to regulation 
by the criminal process. Suggesting that the central lesson to be derived, however, 
• Professor of Law, University of Utah. B.S. 1958, Boston College; LL.B. 1961, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law School; S.J.D. 1967, University of Michigan. 
1 Hypostatization has been defined as 
treating a conceptual, rdational idea as though it were a concrete thing (and, hence, locatable 
in spa.ce and time). This is an error that is often encouraged by the structure of our language. ... 
'IJniS: a person who has learned that he can explain what a hammer is by pointing to a thing, 
a hammer, looks around for something to point to in answer to the question, "what is 
·justi~?" • . . • 
W. BISlUN & C. STONE, LAw, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS 201-02 (1972). Professor Frankd repeatedly 
refers to "the law" without describing what he means by "the law" and leaving an impression that it 
is something to be described like a hammer, when, in fact, there is no such thing to point to. ThUs, 
commenting upon his observations is complicated by indulging in assumptions about the attributes and 
consequences he attributes to "the law." 
'410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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is that morality should not be enforced through criminal sanctions misses the 
point. The question is what moral values should be enforced, from where they 
are to be derived, and, by what process (criminal, civil, or otherwise) should they 
be adopted or rejected by the legal system. Thus, if Frankel's criticism of the 
status of abortion regulation by the legal process pre-Roe tI. Wade is that it was 
based on moral value judgments, the same criticism must be made of post-Roe tI. 
Wade abortion regulation for it too is premised on moral judgments. The source 
of such a morality is not as important as recognizing law as a moral value choice, 
the consequences of implementing the moral value choice made, and the process 
by which the Court employed the morality. Secular value judgments are no less 
"moral" choices and no less "religiously" based, at least from the view that treats 
such beliefs warily because they seem rooted in a conviction that their possessor 
has "truth" - a danger depriving legal institutions and law-making of needed 
tolerance in the decision-making process. Roe tI. Wade is not limited to the moral 
choice of circumscribing the appropriate limits of criminal sanctions, but is a with-
drawal of the societal force of law to protect fetal rights (if any) in favor of leaving 
the control of fetal rights to the discretion of the pregnant woman - a moral value 
choice whichever result is realized. 
If Frankel's comment, on the other hand, is that Roe tI. Wade does at bottom 
present the Court with a moral choice and that the choice made reflects and should 
reflect the moral values of a majority of society, the ice indeed becomes thin. 
Subjecting the legally recognized core values of a society to popular vote, the senti-
ment of the time, or the unrestrained perceptions of a judge surely has been dem-
onstrated to produce unacceptable consequences to a society seeking to maximize 
individualism, extirpate racism or genocide, and preserve a commitment to a 
generally defined and reasonably stable set of core moral values. The dilemma is 
not resolved by labeling some legal regulation as imposed solely to vindicate a 
moral premise. The result of Roe tI. Wade can be viewed as imposing a "law" to 
vindicate the moral premise of a constitutional right of privacy in this sense, but 
understanding is not greatly furthered by positing the issue as one between en-
forcing morality versus enforcing non-morality. The difficulty is only deepened 
by intimating that the moral views of the majority be given primacy, at least 
where the central values of a society are in issue. Compromising those central 
values to satisfy short term or shifting majority choices in a pluralistic society can 
seriously undermine long-range cultural values and objectives, if not rupture the 
very glue of assent to a peaceful resolution of disputes through the legal process. 
The Frankel position on all this is unclear but one is left with the disturbing 
feeling that he may ultimately subscribe to a religious tenet of some secularists-
majority rule even on our most fundamental value judgments about sel£hood. 
Another possible inference is that the Court should sustain some value choices as . 
fixed and immutable truths - a perfectly acceptable choice to govern individual 
moral beliefs and behavior but a danger to be avoided in maintaining a flexible 
and evolutionary legal system. Every legal decision "imposes" a moral viewpoint; 
but all moral choices are not and should not be subject to the intervention of the 
legal process. Professor Frankel does not deal with this deeper question - the 
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ultimate dilemma of when the legal process by action or non-action should impose 
moral choices. 
Or, is Professor Frankel telling us the Court confronted the issues raised by abor-
tion, but was unable to resolve them to a degree where the value choices made 
will "stick" for the foreseeable future? Frankel seems to be gently warning the 
supporters of the result in Roe v. Wade that they may practice and foster abortion, 
but not too much, less the populace becomes over-emotional about the widespread 
destruction of things which look and behave like you and me - except less so 
during the early stages of pregnancy. If it is doubtful that the "moral claims" of 
anti-abortionists will be mollified by such "half measures" as limiting abortions to 
the early stages of pregnancy and in clear cases of necessity, it seems equally likely 
that the "moral claims" of pro-abortionists will not be mollified by such half 
measures. The former seem to have a fixed moral "truth" in the belief of a right 
to privacy, while the latter have a fixed moral "truth" in the personhood of a fetus 
at all stages of development. In either case, the potentially disruptive pressure on 
the legal system will not and perhaps should not be alleviated because the Court 
was up to much more than Frankel seems willing to admit and, the Court may not 
have "pulled it off." 
It may be useful to recognize law as primarily a process by which the values of 
a pluralistic (not secular as Professor Frankel would have) society are implemented 
in the ongoing struggle to achieve order and preserve our cultural concepts of 
selfhood and individualism. The process is a highly sophisticated one involving 
discreet factors of rules, roles, language, a unique reasoning process, perceptions, 
concepts and the entire mix of values and cultural heritage each participant brings 
to the process. Those value judgments intrude upon each step of the process, while 
the role of the decision-maker, the force of the reasoning process, the impact of 
rules, of language, and of values (moral assumptions from wherever derived) act 
as constratints upon otherwise unbridled discretion. 
It may also be useful to view the multiplicity of values underlying the decision-
making process called law as shifting and changing premises rather than eternal 
verities or as moral (religiously based) and non-moral (secular) values. Without 
challenging the possibility that some values may be eternal verities regardless of 
their source - regula or secular - it may be helpful to view the particular values 
of a culture and its legal system as a shifting and changing force field of beliefs 
much in the sense of the metaphor Quine relies upon3 when expostulating the 
"coherence theory" of truth. Certain beliefs exist in the center of that force field 
relatively immune from change. Others are not so central; while still others exist 
in a peripheral area subject to continual challenge and flux. The Court, as trustee 
of this force field of beliefs, must reconcile, import and shift the relative position 
of such beliefs in the ongoing process of evolving the clash between the demands 
of order and individuality to develop - with an eye to the long term cultural values 
and objectives of our society - a fuller realization of the human condition within 
commonly accepted value assumptions of an organized society. Such a model does 
not necessarily make moral values relative; but treats moral values as knowledp-e 
·w. QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 (2d ed. rev. 1961), 
reprinted in W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS 326 (1972). 
1975 ] A RESPONSE 281 
- not truths in the sense of eternal verities. Knowledge, in the sense of the re-
lationship of ideas to consequences of moral values, is used by the legal system to ad-
judicate the ongoing struggle of order and selfhood without either ever becoming 
fixed stars-a luxury individuals and religious organizations may follow in making 
their choices but courts must temper with the principle of tolerance. 
In Roe tI. Wade, the Court was involved in the process of redefining the force 
field of values upon which is premised the ongoing clash of order and individual-
ism in our society. The Court moved more closely to the center of the force field 
of fundamental beliefs a "right of privacy" and in the process defined a further 
aspect of a central belief - person - to exclude fetal personhood. The signifi-
cance of the beliefs defined and balanced is indeed central since the values defined 
present diverse facets of the concept of selfness -life and being on the one side 
and "privacy" and self control of one's body on the other. Viewed from this 
perspective, the value choices presented in Roe tI. Wade go to the very essence of 
the incidents of individualism by defining who or what is entitled to the rights 
of individualism. The Court elaborates the contents of those rights for those the 
Court recognizes as persons entitled to the protection of fundamental rights, 
giving those possessing the rights defined primacy over those not recognized as 
"persons." 
Abortion presents a fundamental conflict of the selfhood of the fetus and that of 
the woman, analytically and morally complicated by the physical dependence of 
the former upon the latter during pregnancy. Euthanasia and suicide, which 
often raise similar value choices centering upon selfhood, do not have this compli-
cating factor except where euthanasia is not self-destruction, but is done by the 
hand of another. The central belief of our cultural and legal system about the form 
and content of personhood in these kinds of cases often invokes regulation by the 
legal process since life and death are central between and among individuals in or-
ganized society and with theinstitutions society has designed to preserve order and 
protect the integrity of selfhood. When legal regulation by courts on such questions 
takes place, stripped of peripheral devices to avoid decision-making (e.g., political 
question, mootness or deference to other rule-making institutions) or of devices to 
deflect decision-making from core values (e.g., void for vagueness, statutory 
construction, or remanding for a decision on other issues), the clash of fundamen-
tal values becomes clear and the moral force of the court in resolving the clash 
is deeply dependent up()n its mastery of the legal process and a sophisticated under-
standing of the moral choices to be made. 
Roe tI. Wade handled the issue of abortion directly - as a confrontation of fetal 
rights and the state's power to protect those rights on the one side, and of the 
pregnant woman's rights and the state's authority to control the exercise of her 
rights on the other. The prevalence of widespread and dangerous illegal abortions, 
the growing recognition of female equality, and the inability of legislative bodies 
to act in a uniform and responsible manner on the issue may well have forced 
the court to take the case stripped to the core values involved. The choice to 
decide the case on its core issues mayor may not have been avoidable, but once 
made it was incumbent upon the Court to do so with the objectives of weighing 
the moral values involved in terms of long term societal consequences, minimizing 
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future dispute, preserving the moral authority of the court, and escaping rejection 
of its decision by widespread non-compliance or constitutional amendment. 
History will judge whether the Court achieved these objectives. But at least 
three aspects of the Court's opinion are troubling and suggest the Court may not 
receive history's acclaim. First, the Court allowed itself . to specify the meaning 
of "person" for fourteenth amendment purposes and excluded fetal life from the 
legal content of the concept. Specifying where personhood begins and ends for 
fourteenth amendment purposes across the continuum of life invites further 
specification of the concept - a concept better left vaguely _!iefined - if at all 
possible. Paradoxically, in a society where concern for life - be it plants, animal, 
or the people of My Lai - seems to be growing, the legal process should avoid 
inflexibility and permit the evolution of such a concept. While acknowledging 
others have been unable to decide when life begins, the Court had no hesitancy 
in deciding when life does not begin for due process purposes. A more sensitive 
awareness of the issues involved or at least humility about deciding the negative 
should have led the Court to avoid the issue. At least the sp~ctacle of the contrast 
of corporations having fourteenth amendment personhood and fetal life not, may 
have been escaped had the Court avoided defining "person" in Roe tI. Wade. 
Second, the Court made the touchstone of state interest in regulating abortion 
an artificial division of pregnancy into trimesters. The Court relied on viability 
and the trimester as defined by scientific (medical) knowledge to create a sliding 
scale of state regulation from no control in the first trimester through extensive 
regulation in the third trimester. Making the balancing process between fetal 
rights and the woman's rights dependent upon such -flimsy facts as scientific 
knowledge (qua truths) predicates the weighing of vital moral values of our 
society on a slippery and elusive foundation. Viability is being pushed back earlier 
and earlier and may one day be recognized (medically) at the moment of con-
ception. Perhaps the problem will be even further complication when the womb 
can be replaced by a test tube. In any event, it is safe to predict that predicating 
the adjudication of fundamental values on scientific facts rather than widely ac-
cepted or acceptable moral beliefs (from wherever derived) can only provoke 
further litigation or the dangerous inflexibility of a legal system which believes 
it has discovered eternal truth! 
A third difficulty with the Court's opinion is that the Court seemed to be moving 
the right of privacy closer to the center of the force field of the value system 
entrusted to its care. A more persuasive justification for primacy of such a right 
could have been made had the Court devoted as much effort to tracing the right's 
origins and history as was devoted to the history of abortion and fetal rights. 
While the specific content of the right was justifiably vague and ambiguous, the 
moral value of the right of privacy the Court was propounding and its potential 
outline may have been more persuasive with care and balance in tracing its source 
and importance in the process of decision. As it is, the decision fails to be per-
• The failure to fully and efficiently implement the moral value choice and commitment of Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was in no small part attributable to the misconception 
that the decision was based on scientific facts. Su g~1IcraJly Kahn, luris(1rud~1lC~. 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
15!} (1955). 
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suasive about privacy and sounds like a rose is a rose is a rose argument. Rational 
discussion about the decision might have also been promoted by a better effort 
to define the source, importance and meaning of the privacy defined. Had the 
Court done so, the subsequent debate might have been more rational and avoided 
such sloganeering as "outrageous nonsense", "bodily integrity", "right to life", 
"presumptuous nonsense", and other emotion ridden verbiage which does little to 
foster knowledge. In either case, the persuasive force of the Court's decision seems 
wanting, and the want appears to be the product of a lack of creative effort or an 
insensitivity to the magnitude of the moral value being propounded vis-a-vis the 
moral values it was being weighed against. 
Although I believe cases like Roe v. Wade make obvious the function of legal 
decision making as the device for implementing long term moral assumptions 
of a society in striking the balance between order and individualism, Professor 
Frankel does not proceed from this assumption. The question is not whether the 
legal process may be used to impose moral values, but the circumstances and 
process by which the values perceived are imposed. An even deeper question is 
how and why certain values are perceived - the issue Frankel seems to struggle 
with, as does the Court implicitly without ever expressly admitting so. Implicity 
Professor Frankel is describing the circumstance in which he believes the Court 
should favor the moral claims of pregnant women and deny fetal claims without 
resolving the deepest question of how the moral values pereceived were arrived at. 
Professor Frankel does not tell us whether these or other pitfalls in Roe fl. Wade, 
with its highly exposed clash of central moral values, will resolve the societal con-
Ricts which provoked the case. We are left with the impression of a vague sense 
of uneasiness in Frankel's mind about what the Court has wrought, and a kind 
of "cool it" advice to the proponents of abortion free of legal constraints. While I 
share Professor Frankel's sense of disquiet, I do so for different reasons. I do not 
think the Court grappled artistically with the issues. The opinion has a tone of 
brute conRict of value judgments rather than sophisticated analysis of a deeply 
troubling conRict of basic values. The clash presented cannot be reconciled by the 
anti-abortionists' one-sided view which ignores the trauma of unwanted pregnancy 
and widespread butchering by illegal abortions; nor can it be resolved by the 
one-sided view of the pro-abortionists' cry of bodily integrity immune from the 
reality of fetal life with all its human attributes. The difficulty is that a sophisti-
cated legal process cannot afford to indulge in the assumption that the moral 
values involved are eternal truths.5 The proponents and opponents do so, and 
seem to expect the legal process of a pluralistic society to do so ignoring the force 
of contrary values contending for the status of central truths. Law-making should 
not establish non-breachable barriers to competing moral value choices but should 
weigh each as bits of knowledge in the never-ending search for truth to govern 
the human condition through the institutions of organized society. When the 
clash is fundamental, wisdom perhaps calls for an unclear result satisfying to no 
• To say this is not to deny the possibility of eternal, discoverable and immutable moral values. 
Nor is it necessary to reject the necessity for relatively immutable moral values at the center of a legal 
system's force field of beliefs. Moral relativism is not the issue when analyzing the appropriate function 
the judicial process must play in a pluralistic society. 
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one view of moral truth. The consequences are too important to yield to the drive 
for certainty and the eternal vindication of a belief in a "truth". Reflection by the 
concerned mind sensitive to the values and realities involved may well produce 
the kind of waffle Professor Frankel exhibits in his final paragraphs. Perhaps the 
conflict cannot be resolved and the best that may be hoped for is a societal effort 
to minimize those factors which place women in the dilemma of facing such 
terrible choices, fetal being in a relatively defenseless posture and judges in having 
to judge the choice made. This is not enough for those who deal in moral abso-
lutes, of course, but it is perhaps the best one can hope for from a court seeking 
to implement an ever shifting but reasonably stable force field of moral values 
underlying the legal process. After all, charging mere mortals to be philosopher 
kings while pretending otherwise, inevitably leaves something to be desired. 
